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R
educing poverty and ending hunger seem to be becom-
ing more difﬁcult goals to achieve. Although the world 
is a lot richer today than it was a decade ago, the numbers of 
poor and hungry people are declining more slowly. Are new 
approaches needed to reduce poverty and hunger? The ﬁrst 
Millennium Development Goal focuses attention on cutting 
the proportions of poor and hungry people in half by 2015, 
but what will become of the people not addressed by that 
goal—the other half left behind?
The three essays that follow explore the challenges the world 
faces in reducing poverty and hunger in a sustainable way. 
In their different emphases—local, national, and global; eco-
nomic and cultural; growth and social protection; traditional 
and new actors—the essays provide new views on what needs 
to be done now to reduce hunger and poverty faster.1
I
f economic growth alone could rapidly reduce poverty and hunger, many 
parts of the developing world ought to be much freer from these scourges 
than they are. To be sure, rapid economic growth in many developing countries, 
and agricultural growth in particular, has advanced global progress in reduc-
ing poverty and hunger. But even growth that reduces poverty has its limits in 
reaching and including extremely poor and hungry people. Especially in envi-
ronments of high inequality and poor governance, growth often does little to 
improve the livelihoods of those at the bottom of the income scale. And while 
growth is key to cutting poverty initially, its power to reduce poverty and the 
dangers to human well-being—such as childhood malnutrition—diminishes as 
poverty reduction progresses. 
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The world has, of course, made a commitment to cut hunger and poverty in half. In 2000, 189 coun-
tries adopted the eight Millennium Development Goals that set targets not only for poverty and hunger, 
but also for primary education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases, environmental sustainability, and global partnership. Yet at the current rate of poverty decline, 
even if the ﬁrst goal of halving poverty and hunger by 2015 is achieved, at least 800 million people will 
still be left in poverty and 600 million will be left hungry. To move from the relative goals of cutting 
the proportions of poverty and hunger in half toward completely ending hunger and further reducing 
poverty quickly requires a new set of actions. 
This intransigent poverty calls for two main policy responses. On the one hand, there is a need to 
seek the kind of growth that will bring beneﬁts to the poorest people. On the other hand, there is a need 
for additional action that will improve living standards for those people who are not in a position to take 
advantage of the beneﬁts of growth—the youngest, the oldest, the sick, the disabled, and other vulner-
able groups. To reach the poorest people in developing countries, it is time to take more action for social 
protection and to take it earlier in the development process and on a larger scale. 
But is it feasible to reach the poorest in the ﬁrst place? If so, what is the best mix of policies for 
growth and social protection in different countries? What kinds of strategies, policies, and interventions 
have been successful in reaching the poorest people? 
THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF POVERTY
The world can take some satisfaction in the fact that poverty in general is declining, both as a share 
of the population and in absolute terms. Globally, the share of the population living on less than US$1 
a day has decreased substantially, from 29 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 2004. The number of poor 
living on less than US$1 a day has also fallen, from 1.25 billion to 969 million. The greatest progress has 
been made in East Asia and the Paciﬁc, where the share of the poor fell from 30 percent in 1990 to 9 
percent in 2004. In contrast, the share of the poor in Sub-Saharan Africa has decreased by a little more 
than 5 percentage points and remains above 40 percent (Ravallion et al. 2007 and Figure 1). 
Economic growth has certainly played an important role in poverty reduction in some countries 
since 1990, but its results have been mixed between countries and between population groups within 
countries. Empirical results from 14 countries show that the effects of a 1 percentage point increase 
in economic growth have ranged from a 0.73 percentage point decrease in poverty to no change in 
poverty at all (Klasen and Misselhorn 2006). Although high economic growth in the urban and coastal 
areas of China has decreased poverty in those areas, the rural and inland areas have been left behind in 
terms of growth and poverty reduction. Whereas in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s poverty fell by 16 percent 
in China, it decreased by 8 percent in the ﬁrst half of this decade. Growth in India has been associated 
with a decrease in poverty among the scheduled castes but has failed to decrease poverty among the 
scheduled tribes (Thorat and Mahamallik 2005) and child malnutrition has hardly declined.
On a positive note, however, growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia has picked up in recent 
years compared to the 1990s, increasing from about 2 to 6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and from 
about 5 to 8 percent in South Asia. While comprehensive poverty data are not yet available for the 
recent years, there are indications that poverty and nutrition data are improving in some countries in 
Africa, such as Ethiopia. 3
How are the forces of urbanization and globalization affecting the poorest people? Do these forces 
offer the promise of improved livelihoods? Although poverty has traditionally been concentrated in rural 
areas, the urban share of the poor increased from 19 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 2002. But urban 
areas are not likely to be the main locus of poverty anytime soon. Seventy-ﬁve percent of the poor in 
developing countries continue to live in rural areas. Rural poverty continues to be more prevalent and 
deeper than urban poverty and is likely to remain so for the next several decades (Ravallion et al. 2007).
The links between globalization and poverty reduction are mixed. Globalization takes place in three 
key areas—(1) markets and trade, (2) investment and capital ﬂows, and (3) information and inno- 
vation—and each has mixed implications for poverty. Evidence shows, for instance, that liberalized 
trade increases poverty in nonagricultural and wage-dependent households and reduces poverty in 
agriculture-dependent households. The impact of foreign investment on the poor is also mixed. In the 
labor-intensive sector, foreign direct investment decreases poverty, whereas in the capital-and-knowl-
edge-intensive sector, foreign direct investment tends to increase poverty. If foreign direct investment 
increases economic growth and government revenue, the poor can beneﬁt indirectly, but only if growth 
is pro-poor and government revenue is channeled to pro-poor public investments and social protection. 
New information and communication technologies can beneﬁt the poor by reducing transaction costs 
and opening new markets. 
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Figure 2—Change in the Rate of Ultra Poverty, 1990–2004 
Evidence suggests that the poorest people are getting left further and further behind. A recent  
IFPRI study of extreme poverty categorizes the poor into three groups: (1) the “proximal” poor—people 
living on between one dollar and three-quarters of a dollar a day; (2) the “medial” poor—people living  
on between three-quarters and half a dollar a day; and (3) the “ultra” poor—people living on less than 
half a dollar a day (Ahmed et al. 2007). Of the 969 million living on less than US$1 a day in 2004, half 
were proximal poor, one-third were medial poor, and 17 percent were ultra poor. Most of the proximal 
and medial poor live in South Asia, but three-quarters of all ultra poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The number of the poor in all categories is decreasing, but the number of the ultra poor decreased by 
less than it would have if everyone had benefited from growth equally. And although the welfare of the 
ultra poor improved in some individual countries between 1990 and 2004, the share of the world's ultra 
poor living in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America overall actually rose (Figure 2).
There are other ways to examine the characteristics of poverty as well. For instance, does poverty 
persist because the same group of people continues to stay poor or because as some people move out 
of poverty, others move into it? Research shows that about 300 to 420 million people are chronically 
poor, of whom the largest number live in Southeast Asia (CPRC 2005). The share of the chronically poor 
in all poor is the highest, however, in Sub-Saharan Africa (30–40 percent). But there are also consider-
able flows in and out of poverty. While some households may never become poor, some households 
may always be poor and others are sometimes poor. Cross-country studies find that the category of 
“sometimes poor” (transient poverty) is often larger than the category of  “always poor” (chronic poverty) 
(Baulch and Hoddinott 2000). In the medium and long run, many individuals move between these  
categories, but most of the ultra poor remain in chronic poverty. 
Source: Ahmed et al. 2007.
Note: The figure uses regional decomposition analysis to show each region's contribution to changes in the global 
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The poorest populations continue to live in geographically adverse or remote areas, often in coun-
tries with poor governance and civil conﬂict. Children who inherited poverty, women, orphans, and the 
elderly are among the most vulnerable groups. Unexpected adverse events, ill health and disability, and 
weather and economic shocks are linked to severe deprivation. The poor and the hungry also own fewer 
assets (including land), have limited access to credit markets, and are often excluded from social net-
works and political power. The social and economic exclusion of certain groups of people such as ethnic 
minorities or unregistered urban migrants is also a cause of persistent poverty among these groups. 
Hunger also remains high. Although the global hunger index (GHI)—which is a combined measure  
of insufﬁcient availability of food, shortfalls in the nutritional status of children, and child mortality— 
improved signiﬁcantly in South and Southeast Asia from 1990 to 2004, progress was limited in the 
Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Wiesmann 2007). The number of under- 
nourished people in developing countries even increased from 1992 to 2004. Although the number 
of undernourished people in East Asia fell by 18 percent, largely reﬂecting declining poverty in China, 
the number of undernourished in Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 26 percent. The share of undernourished 
people in the population also rose over that period in the Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Figure 3).
Figure 3—Prevalence of Undernourishment in Developing Countries, 1992–2004  
                     (% of population) 
Sources: FAO 2006 and World Bank 2007.
Note: The bubbles represent millions of undernourished people in 2004. EAP—East Asia and the Paciﬁc, LAC—Latin 
America and the Caribbean, SA—South Asia, SSA—Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA—Middle East and North Africa, ECA—
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Moreover, a lack of important micronutrients such as vitamin A, iron, and zinc during childhood 
increases the risk of chronic disease throughout the child's lifetime and increases the risk of diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, and cancer during adulthood. This risk remains high in many developing coun-
tries: more than 80 percent of children under the age of ﬁve in Burkina Faso suffer from iron deﬁciency, 
and more than 70 percent of children under the age of six in Benin suffer from vitamin A deﬁciency. 
Although the number of preschool children with iron deﬁciency fell in all regions of the world between 
1990 and 2000, more than 70 percent of preschool children in India and Sub-Saharan Africa are iron 
deﬁcient (Micronutrient Initiative and UNICEF 2005).
Despite progress in alleviating world poverty and hunger, the poorest and the hungriest are being 
left behind. It is now crucial to pursue a two-pillared strategy to reduce poverty drastically and elimi-
nate hunger. These pillars—promoting growth that brings beneﬁts to the poorest and enhancing social 
protection measures—are both more necessary and more feasible than ever before.
Why is there a special need for such policies now? Poor people are facing multiple new risks, includ-
ing climate change, rising food prices and costs of access to safe water, threats to health, and the loss of 
traditional social protection based on family and community in the context of rural–urban change. These 
risks lead to enormous stresses on poor populations and more ﬂuctuations in and out of poverty. At the 
same time, the poor’s perception of relative deprivation—the feeling of being left behind—increases due 
to knowledge about the lifestyles of the emerging middle class and the rich.  
Why should these policies be any easier to implement today than they have been in the past?  
Many developing countries have achieved impressive levels of wealth and rates of economic growth. 
Many have improved their capacity to implement policies through decentralization and other reforms. 
New information technologies and new institutions (like microﬁnance institutions), and new partners 
(like the private sector and nongovernmental organizations) are becoming increasingly interested in 
and involved with developing countries and the development community. The role of the private sector 
in assisting the poorest of the poor can also expand—by creating forms of catastrophic health, life, or 
weather insurance programs, for example, which could be partially ﬁnanced by governments or do-
nors, but contracted out to private ﬁrms for implementation. In addition, advancements in science and 
technology can now offer a great deal in terms of addressing micronutrient malnutrition through crop 
technology and other fortiﬁcation interventions.   
As never before, policymakers are being confronted by increasingly complex challenges arising 
simultaneously—globalization, climate change, and changes in energy prices, for example—in addition to 
persistent poverty and hunger. Although there is increasing information on who and where poor people 
are, what challenges they face, and how they move in and out of poverty (see Box 1), more research 
and knowledge would help policymakers identify the most appropriate policies in complex and chang-
ing circumstances. The development research communities must also change and build new bridges; 
in particular, the more growth-focused and the more social-protection-focused branches must come 
together more than they have done thus far. A great deal of institutional and policy research is needed 
to determine optimal solutions that build on institutional capital and social capital in various countries.
WHAT DIRECTION FOR POLICY?7
INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND ENHANCED SOCIAL PROTECTION
Many counties that experienced signiﬁcant economic growth in recent years have found that the 
opportunities and beneﬁts were unevenly distributed. In addition, many other countries, such as agrarian 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, have not achieved the levels of growth that can pull large propor-
tions of their citizens out of poverty. Now growth must be directed in ways that include the poor in its 
rewards via the two-pillared approach mentioned above.
First, agricultural growth that beneﬁts the poor more than growth in other sectors should be accel-
erated. Science and technology and rural infrastructure can play key roles. But poor, small-scale farmers 
cannot jump start agricultural growth on their own. To help farmers emerge from poverty, governments 
need to improve infrastructure and education, distribute technologies and inputs, and promote producer 
and marketing organizations that link small farmers to new market chains. Pro-poor public investment 
research at IFPRI shows that to achieve higher growth and poverty reduction, governments should invest 
more in research and development, education, health, and infrastructure.
Second, social protection must be improved and introduced earlier via public action to confront 
unacceptably high levels of deprivation and risk. Social and cultural values have traditionally placed the 
primary responsibility of social protection 
on family and on community ties. While 
public policies should complement rather 
than substitute informal social protection 
arrangements, the magnitude and severity 
of new types of shocks (such as the ﬁnan-
cial crisis of the late 1990s; health and 
economic risks arising from avian inﬂu-
enza, SARS, and HIV/AIDS; global climate 
change; and armed conﬂicts resulting in 
an inﬂux of refugees into neighboring 
countries) have revealed the limitations of 
informal interventions and the need for 
strengthening public and market-based 
social protection mechanisms.
Social protection policies may include 
social safety nets such as conditional 
transfer and public works programs, 
health insurance, and social security. This 
call for rapid expansion of such policies in developing countries is based not only on a moral imperative, 
but also on economic efﬁciency. Improving the lives and livelihoods of the poorest people is an invest-
ment that will allow them to become productive participants in the economic life of their countries (see 
Box 2).
To be sure, implementing social protection policies presents a complex challenge to government 
ﬁscal and administrative capacities. Reaching people living in remote areas, informal sector workers, 8
socially excluded individuals, and those affected by civil conﬂict is particularly difﬁcult. Since these char-
acteristics often overlap for the poorest of the poor, they are often excluded from the coverage of public 
protection mechanisms. There is, however, the issue of the ‘reach’ or capacity of the state to provide 
services to the poor; where capacity is limited, the ability to deliver resources to the poorest will be con-
strained. In failed states and countries with internal military conﬂict, the capacity for social protection 
policies also fails. It will be really difﬁcult in many places to address conditions of dire poverty. However, 
making progress in the broader peace and security arenas remains critical for sustained poverty reduc-
tion in these contexts. 
Only a few developing countries have implemented universal, non-contributory (or quasi-contribu-
tory) pension systems for the elderly. Brazil’s rural pension system, for example, is heavily subsidized by 
the government and creates substantial ﬁscal pressures, but has achieved impressive results in terms of 
coverage. The scheme covers 90 percent of the elderly in rural areas. A universal pension system for the 
elderly might halve poverty in Latin America, but its ﬁscal costs would be substantial.
It is also expensive to extend coverage of health insurance schemes to the poor since they cannot 
afford to insure themselves at a rate corresponding to the cost of risk involved. In the absence of health 
insurance, large out-of-pocket health expenditures can push households into poverty, so developing 
countries also need to adopt public health insurance systems despite the ﬁscal costs involved.
In terms of public works programs, India and China have set successful examples that many coun-
tries can follow. Based on income-generating activities, these programs provide employment, absorb 
unskilled labor, and provide services to the community. The Employment Guarantee Scheme, initiated 
in 1973 in the Indian state of Maharashtra, has been quite successful in employing the poor, especially 
poor women, as well as providing public goods like irrigation infrastructure and rural roads. India’s 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which was adopted in February 2006, provided 
employment amounting to about 1 billion person-days per year in 2006–2007, a year that was primarily 
a learning phase (Drèze and Oldiges 2007). Once the Act is fully implemented, it is expected that it could 
easily generate more than double that amount of employment.
Conditional cash transfers are becoming increasingly popular and are linked to the development of 
human capital. Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly known as PROGRESA—Programa de Educación, Salud, y 
Alimentación) has provided cash transfers to mothers among extremely poor populations in rural Mexico 
since 1990. Because the transfers are conditional on children’s school attendance and visits to health 9
centers, they have simultaneously improved poor households’ nutrition, health, and education (Skouﬁas 
2005). By the end of 1999, the program had provided assistance to one-ninth of all families in Mexico. 
In 2006, its budget reached about US$3 billion. From the late 1990s onward, conditional cash transfer 
programs were widely adopted in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as to some extent in Africa 
and Central and South Asia. To make these programs as effective as possible, low-income countries may 
need to overcome political, administrative, and ﬁscal constraints. And it is essential to examine new 
ways in which interventions can be integrated or coordinated rather than existing as a series of stand-
alone activities as they currently do. For example, the introduction of a new agricultural technology in 
a shock-prone environment may not be very successful (since households won’t adopt it because they 
can’t afford the failure) and social transfers may have limited effects on sustainable poverty reduction. 
But an integrated approach providing some form of social assistance in the context of introducing new 
agricultural technologies might overcome both these problems.
Can developing countries learn from the industrial countries’ decades of experience with social 
insurance programs? The ﬁrst comprehensive coverage social insurance program was established by 
Chancellor von Bismarck in Germany in the 1880s, and was later followed by similar programs in some 
other European countries. Today, the GDP per capita in China and Latin America is higher than it was 
in Germany when it implemented its social security system. Currently, spending on social security in 
developed countries ranges from 31 percent of GDP in Sweden to 16 percent of GDP in the United States 
(Dethier 2007). The available—though scarce—data for developing countries shows that they spend much 
less than that. In Sub-Saharan Africa, governments spend less than 10 percent of GDP on social assis-
tance. Although a universal system of health assistance and a minimum pension for the elderly may be 
difﬁcult to replicate immediately in developing countries, social protection should probably be phased in 
much earlier than is currently the case in many countries. 
But it is not sufﬁcient to provide safety nets to ensure pro-poor growth. A dual approach that is  
adjusted to country circumstances is needed, where poor people are supported by development strate-
gies such as investing in agricultural research, providing quality education, enhancing health care facili-
ties, and improving transportation infrastructure. Government interventions should be integrated, coor-
dinated, and supported by good governance practices. They should also be tailored to meet the different 
needs of poor people in different situations. The chronically poor may need accessible labor markets; the 
newly poor may need health services and housing; and those who have recently escaped poverty may 
need assistance with irrigation and education, for example. 
Ultimately, expanding social protection and generating pro-poor inclusive growth must not be seen 
as two separate and exclusive approaches, but as synergistic strategies that work hand in hand. Current-
ly, the social-protection component of this dual strategy is undervalued in many countries and is phased 
in too late. But people who live healthy and productive lives can contribute to national economic growth 
and welfare. Research has shown that interventions to improve childhood nutrition pay off in increased 
lifetime earnings. At the same time, pro-poor growth can directly and indirectly improve the lives and 
livelihoods of poor people. 
As they consider their policy options, policymakers must remember that poverty and hunger repre-
sent human misery on an enormous scale. In the end, action aimed at alleviating poverty and hunger 
among the most destitute is a humanitarian and moral obligation that they must meet. 10
 Box 1—Five Facts about Those  
Who Remain Poor and Hungry 
1.  The poor are becoming increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and in countries where progress has been stagnant and 
conﬂict has been present. In 1990, 19 percent of those living on less 
than a dollar a day lived in Sub-Saharan Africa; in 2004, 31 percent 
did. A staggering 76 percent of those living on less than 50 cents a 
day live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, a third of those living in 
absolute poverty in developing countries live in countries deﬁned as 
“difﬁcult environments” due to conﬂict or state collapse. 
2.  Poverty and widespread hunger remain in regions of high economic 
growth and substantial reduction in poverty. East Asia and the 
Paciﬁc, for example, have experienced rapid growth and substan-
tial poverty reductions since the early 1990s, but have discovered 
that further poverty reduction has become more difﬁcult. In China, 
poverty declined by 16 percentage points during the ﬁrst half of the 
1990s and by 8 percentage points in the ﬁrst half of this decade. 
3.  Although the number of urban poor and the prevalence of hunger in 
urban areas are increasing, most poor people live in predominantly 
rural areas and will continue to do so in the next 15–20 years. This 
is even true for Asia, which has changed dramatically in the past  
20 years: 85 percent of the population still lives in rural areas, and 
75 percent will continue to do so in 2015. Best estimates suggest 
that the majority of those living on less than a dollar a day will be 
found in rural areas until 2040.
4.  Those in poverty are not a static group—there are movements in 
and out. For example, an IFPRI study of poverty dynamics in rural 
Ethiopia found that about 20 percent of households were poor in 
both 1994 and 2004, 35 percent were not poor in both periods, 27 
percent moved out of poverty, and 13 percent moved into poverty.
5.  Overall, poverty and hunger reduction has been slower among the 
poorest and among excluded groups like ethnic groups, certain 
castes, women, and disabled people. In Guatemala, for example, 
poverty fell by 25 percent between 1989 and 2000 for non-indig-
enous groups, but only by 15 percent for indigenous groups. Other 
countries have had similar experiences. 
Sources: Ahmed et al. 2007, Chen and Ravallion 2007, Collier 2007, Dercon et al.  
2007, Ravallion et al. 2007, World Bank 2007, Hall and Patrinos 2005.11
 Box 2—Five Ways Social Protection  
Programs Promote Economic Growth 
1.  Social safety nets help create individual, household, and community 
assets. Economic growth requires using assets to generate economic 
returns, but poverty makes it difﬁcult or impossible for poor people 
to invest in such assets. Social safety nets can help create human  
assets like good nutrition and education as well as physical assets 
like roads and irrigation facilities.
2.  They help households protect assets when shocks occur. Shocks like 
ﬂoods, droughts, and civil strife are pervasive in developing coun-
tries and can lead poor people to deplete their savings and reduce 
their consumption, with far-reaching effects for entire communities. 
Social protection policies can mitigate the devastating economic 
effects of these shocks.
3.  By helping households cope with risk, they permit households to use 
their existing resources more effectively. Since the threat of shocks 
keeps poor households from making investments that could offer 
high returns, social safety nets act as a form of insurance that gives 
poor households the freedom to innovate in ways that could be 
economically productive.
4.  They facilitate structural reforms to the economy. Policy changes 
designed to facilitate long-term economic growth could impose 
short-term costs on some segments of the population. Safety nets 
can compensate households for the costs of such policy shifts and 
make them politically feasible.
5.  By reducing inequality, they directly raise growth rates. Recent 
evidence suggests that high levels of inequality impede economic 
growth. By reducing inequality, social protection policies can create 
the conditions for growth to occur.
Source: Alderman and Hoddinott 2007.12
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W
e live in an age of uncertainty—an age that evokes both a sense   
of hope and one of deep concern. It is a time of hope because, perhaps  
like never before, we are witness to so many distinct efforts to shape a 
better and more peaceful world for all. We see governments joining hands   
to enhance the well-being of citizens and the global community through   
shared knowledge and technology, common markets, and commitments to 
environmental protection. We also hear myriad civil society voices stand-
ing shoulder-to-shoulder with governments for a more humane society 
and a secure planet.
 
Spaces of the Poor
Amrita Patel14
But it is also a time when fact sometimes pushes the limits of credulity. In the time that I take to 
write this line, somewhere in the world we have lost a fellow human to hunger. Ninety percent of the 
world’s hungry people live in South Asia and Africa, and more than 50 percent of them are farmers en-
gaged in producing food for the world. In an age of huge advances in medical technology, as many as  
1 in 16 women in Sub-Saharan Africa are at mortal risk during childbirth, and in that region 1 of every 
10 newborn children will not live beyond his or her ﬁrst year. In a year during which the world registered 
an overall economic growth rate of about 8 percent, the number of unemployed people increased by 
nearly 2 percent. Just under half of the unemployed are youth. Women’s participation in the workforce is 
69 percent of that of men. In nonagricultural paid work, only 43 percent of workers are women, and only 
25 percent of these are in managerial and legislative positions, in a stark representation of the lack of 
opportunities that results from gender bias. 
Looking beyond our kind, every day more than a hundred other life forms are being forced into 
extinction. This rate exceeds their natural vulnerability by three to four times the power of ten. Growing 
desertiﬁcation is not only irrevocably changing the natural environment, but also resulting in a decrease 
in the capacity of ecosystems to support the subsistence needs of almost 200 million people worldwide. 
The threat of unmitigated climate change looms large, challenging the adaptive capacity of human and 
natural systems. Freshwater supplies of a sixth of the world’s population are expected to decline, and in-
creases in droughts and ﬂoods are projected to affect local production, especially in subsistence sectors. 
The number of ecological refugees—people forced to ﬂee their homes for environmental reasons—is on 
the increase, with the United Nations estimating the ﬁgure at 250 million people in Africa alone. 
In the face of these testing times, we have as a global 
community taken many responsive steps. One, of course, is 
the “promise for 2015”—the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)—a commitment undertaken by the countries of the 
world at the turn of the millennium. It comes in a line of 
other international agreements aimed at achieving sustain-
able development and conservation of biodiversity. 
We have also seen a host of initiatives from civil society 
claiming the rights of disenfranchised, from the movement 
for civil rights and universal franchise to efforts on behalf 
of environmental protection and regional peace. There have 
also been numerous instances of more local but equally 
powerful collective action, like the dairy cooperative move-
ment spearheaded by small farmers in India, the microcredit 
revolution in Bangladesh, and the protests against privatiza-
tion of the water supply in Bolivia. 
This essay seeks to examine some questions posed by 
the scale of human poverty against the backdrop of the 
equally large threat to the ecological foundations on which 
the poor survive. 15
A cursory glance at regional histories from across the world reveals that they are inextricably woven 
with the environmental histories of communities. From the early days of awe and wonder, to an attitude 
of conquest, to the present age of ever-widening inquiry and research, we have traversed winding paths 
of environmentalism. 
But environmentalism’s most difﬁcult challenge yet is a product of our times. Irrespective of their 
development trajectories, the countries of the world are being forced to reﬂect on their responses and 
contributions to a global strategy of mitigation of environmental degradation and climate change. And 
respond we must, for the consequences are severe, even in contemplation.  
Global warming may bring a rise in global temperatures of 2–3 degrees centigrade, and the resilience 
of many ecosystems will be exceeded in the 21st century owing to an unprecedented combination of 
climate change and other global change drivers such as land use change, pollution, and overexploitation 
of resources. Water volumes stored in glaciers and snow cover will decrease and, with them, water avail-
ability in regions that are currently home to more than 1 billion people. 
THE RESONANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 
Ecological Collapse
Ecological systems that have been the basis of life on the planet are in a state of disrepair. Frag-
mented by the assaults of myriad human projects, the inherent resilience of these systems to repeated 
and prolonged stresses continues to be seriously undermined. There are already signs of this degradation 
in the form of global changes in climate, hydrological patterns, and other critical ecological functions, 
as well as the desertiﬁcation of millions of hectares of once-productive land. At a steadily increasing 
pace, species of plants and animals are vanishing as they lose their natural habitats or fall prey to human 
enterprise. These are not just individual resources that we are losing for human consumption, but threads 
that make up the web of life.
The Living Planet Index measures trends in the Earth’s biological diversity, tracks wild species, and 
monitors the health of ecosystems. This index suggests that we are now degrading natural ecosystems 
at a rate unprecedented in human history. The human ecological footprint—a measure of the area of bio-
logically productive land and water needed to provide ecological resources and services—surpassed the 
Earth’s biocapacity to meet human needs in the 1980s. As of 2003, it exceeded the Earth’s biocapacity by 
about 25 percent. Humanity is no longer living off of nature’s interest, but drawing down on its capital.
15
Ecosystem People in Distress
There is an irony in the pattern of the impact of this ecological collapse. Many people and commu-
nities are involved in production deriving from their natural resource base and live in close association 
with the natural environment on which they depend for their livelihoods and cultural lives. It is these 
communities that the environmental crisis will immediately and forcefully hit. 16
THE MANY SHADES OF POVERTY
Much of our understanding of poverty on national and regional scales comes from poverty assess-
ments that have traditionally referred to material or monetary measures of well-being. Over the past 
century, however, a more multidimensional understanding has emerged that recognizes the social and 
psychological nature of the burden of poverty. This wider perception is reﬂected in Amartya Sen’s  
description of poverty as a lack of capabilities that enable a person to live a life she or he values,  
covering the domains of health, education, income,  
human rights, and empowerment. Participatory poverty 
assessments have borne out some dimensions of this 
deﬁnition. Apart from material deprivation, being poor 
is a matter of sickness and chronic pain, loss of familial 
and social roles, lack of access to information and insti-
tutions, and a lack of self-conﬁdence. 
Crises of Agriculture 
There is clear overlap between areas of acute pov-
erty and rural landscapes in the developing world. The 
context of poverty here cannot be seen apart from the 
crises of agricultural systems in the region. More than 
two-thirds of the rural population lives on small farms 
of less than two hectares in area. A recent report on the 
future of small farms—characterized not only by area, 
but also by low technology, the use of family labor, and 
a subsistence orientation—talks of the challenges to 
small farmers (Hazell et al. 2007). 
These ecosystem people tend to have more limited coping capacities and are more dependent on 
climate-sensitive resources such as local water and food supplies. At lower latitudes, even moder-
ate temperature increases are projected to have negative impacts on crop productivity, and increased 
droughts and ﬂoods will compromise agriculture, especially in subsistence sectors. A study on the politi-
cal economy of hunger among tribal groups in two states of India ﬁnds 99 percent of the population 
living in chronic hunger. About 55 percent of the people identify the decline in the availability of minor 
forest produce, owing to deforestation and degradation of forests, as the most important factor weaken-
ing their food security (Centre for Environment and Food Security 2005).
Although the immediate effects of ecosystem change will be on the poorest, eventually the impact 
will be much broader, with the declines in food and water supplies likely to spawn acute contestations 
and violence in rural and urban areas alike. 17
A Double Burden 
Among the starkest reﬂections of the sociocultural discrimination of our times is poverty’s embrace 
of about half the world’s population by virtue of their gender. Women everywhere are among the poor-
est within their communities. They are disempowered on dual fronts—over the factors of production 
and in their reproductive lives. The binds of patriarchy in its varying forms still constrain many of their 
entitlements.
Throughout the 1990s in the developing world, women’s role in agriculture rose, remained stable, or 
dropped slightly, whereas men’s role clearly declined (Speildoch 2007). Women are the main producers of 
about 60–80 percent of the food in the developing world, especially staple crops such as rice, wheat, and 
maize. With increasing market concentration, women continue to have more difﬁculty than their male 
counterparts in getting good land, credit, training, and access to markets. The marginalization of women 
in research and policy related to food and agriculture is extraordinary. It is an obscurity that contributes 
to the unintelligibility of poverty.
Their livelihoods are worsening as a 
consequence of declines or degradation 
in land or water resources, aggravated 
by competing claims on these resources 
by multiple stakeholders—farmers, 
pastoralists, and industries. Together, 
shrinking farm sizes, insecure tenure, 
deforestation and erosion, declining  
  soil fertility, and degradation of water 
and land form the crisis in the farming system that is also apparent in the livestock economy. About 600 
million of the poorest people in the developing world are livestock keepers, but livestock-based systems 
are coming under pressure. Sedentary farmers on arable land are rapidly marginalizing pastoral popula-
tions throughout Africa and Central Asia. The International Livestock Research Institute’s (ILRI) recent 
report Mapping Poverty and Livestock in the Developing World projects that 50 years from now, the 
areas presently within the livestock- and rangeland-based production system and without any cropping 
potential will face a risk of overgrazing and rangeland degradation, high food insecurity, drought, and 
limited access to local and other markets (ILRI 2002). 
The farming sector, along with associated services and industries, accounts for almost 60–75 percent 
of rural work. A study by the International Labour Organization (ILO) reports that the share of wage 
employment in agriculture, especially the number of wage-dependent smallholders in agriculture, is 
continuing to increase across the globe and accounts for some 40 percent of the world’s agricultural 
workforce (ILO 2003). Of the 450 million workers in agricultural wage employment, 20–30 percent are 
women. Indigenous people and migrants form a signiﬁcant part of this workforce. 18
A Mosaic of Deprivation 
It is possible to see that three interrelated dimen-
sions of poverty—a lack of income and productive 
assets, a lack of access to essential economic and 
social services, and a lack of power, participation, 
and respect—keep the poor trapped in poverty. These 
Low health status is considered one of the principal non-income characteristics of poverty. For those 
who lack material and other productive assets, a capacity for labor and a healthy body are the core com-
ponents of their livelihood, and even their survival strategy. Poor people, however, are most susceptible 
to illness and premature death from dietary causes, and their children are prone to low birth weight and 
generally lack access to medical care. 
A study from the Indian state of Gujarat ﬁnds two factors with robust associations with poverty 
creation—health and debt. Affordable and accessible health services, together with cheaper consumer 
credit, can help enormously in preventing households’ needless decline in material status. Further, there is 
evidence to suggest that these factors may also matter in other parts of the developing world (Asfaw 2003). 
Lack of skills, including literacy and primary education, has been another factor that perpetuates the 
cycle of poverty. A study in 15 major states of India spanning three decades (Datt and Ravallion 2002) 
ﬁnds that rural and human resource development appear to have strong synergies with an expanding 
nonfarm economy in reducing poverty. Among the conditions found to matter signiﬁcantly to prospects 
for pro-poor growth, the role played by initial literacy is particularly notable. 
Poverty is also the deprivation of a voice. Many 
people in developing countries, directly dependent on 
natural resources, have little say in how those resourc-
es are used but suffer the consequences when deci-
sions are corrupt and resource use is destructive. The 
breakdown of many social institutions that functioned 
as safety nets and strengthened collective articulation 
has also contributed to poor people’s lack of represen-
tation in key decisionmaking processes. The attenuation 
of these institutional spaces quickly translates into 
economic hurdles. For example, rural peoples’ liveli-
hoods are often in direct conﬂict with extractive indus-
tries such as large-scale ﬁshing, logging, or mining, but 
rural people have little say in resolving these conﬂicts. 
Access to decisionmakers—government bureaucrats, 
lawmakers, or the courts—is typically for the powerful, 
not the poor, who remain on the periphery of gover-
nance processes.
On the Periphery19
Most poverty analysts agree that growth in per capita income is essential to reducing poverty and 
that persistent growth failures are accompanied by persistent failures to reduce poverty. But is the rate 
of poverty reduction commensurate with the rate of economic growth? We have too often been asked  
to consider “trickle-down” inevitable, but in many cases the trickle is scant, if it arrives at all. The UK’s 
Department for International Development ﬁnds that when conditions are highly unequal, a national 
economic growth rate of 6 percent might be required to achieve a 1 percent improvement in the in-
comes of the poorest (DFID 1999).
So when is growth pro-poor? According to an ILO report, when increases in output are concentrated 
in the economic sectors in which most of the poor work, and when this growth generates more income 
for people living in poverty, growth is pro-poor (ILO 2003). Making a strong case for the conservation of 
natural resources to alleviate poverty, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report argues that enabling 
all countries to achieve the MDGs requires identifying high-priority public investments to empower poor 
people (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). 
Gomanee et al. (2003) and Mosley et al. (2004) ﬁnd that higher government expenditures on educa-
tion, agriculture, housing, and amenities (like water, sanitation, and social security) all have a signiﬁcant 
impact on poverty. Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1999) ﬁnd that among these categories, spending on agricul-
tural research and development (R&D) and rural roads has by far the largest impacts on both growth and 
poverty reduction in India. Some argue, however, that inadequate extension services have prevented re-
search results from reaching the poor and that extensive road networks help industry more than they do 
poor people. Interestingly, the same authors, in a similar analysis of Chinese provinces, ﬁnd that spending 
on rural education has the largest impact on poverty (Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2002). 
GROWTH IN THE FACE OF INEQUALITY: THE DILEMMA
The Embeddedness of Economic Growth 
What matters most perhaps is the character of economic growth. It is clear, however, that the socio-
cultural-political context of growth also has a large inﬂuence on outcomes. Economic growth is essen-
tially embedded in the prevailing trends of the political economy. The belief that exploitation of natural 
resources can be a strategy to lift the incomes of poor people is a good illustration of this. Natural 
dimensions seem to reinforce one another, rendering the poor further vulnerable to violence, crime, and 
economic catastrophes (Narayan et al. 2000; Narayan and Petesch 2002). And most important, poverty 
seems to promote a high discount rate for the future, with a planning horizon that must be focused on 
everyday subsistence. 
In the face of heightened vulnerability, poor people seem to face increasing challenges, including 
new production technologies that require higher capital inputs, changes to marketing chains that restrict 
buying power to a few, declines in commodity prices, inadequate institutional arrangements for engag-
ing with markets, and vulnerability to environmental degradation and climate change. In a fast-changing 
world, the narrowing of the role of the state in the provision of basic subsistence further forces the poor 
to migrate out of their subsistence contexts. 20
resources provide a safety net for the poorest and are vital to their health. Whether they really provide 
a long-term economic route out of poverty, however, is less clear (Angelsen and Wunder 2003). Indeed, 
the very subsistence nature of these activities, such as small-scale ﬁshing, grazing, and nontimber forest 
produce harvesting and processing, is what allows the poor to undertake them. Although the technology 
is inexpensive, the low density of the resource often means that proﬁt margins are also very low. One  
solution is to raise the returns from such activities. Adding value, however, might encourage the non-
poor to engage in these activities and reduce opportunities for the poor. For example, the commercial-
ization of nontimber forest produce can lead to a breakdown of communal property arrangements in 
favor of private property arrangements that exclude the poor (Neumann and Hirsch 2000).
As with natural resources, so with the promise of free markets. Free markets offer some clear ben-
eﬁts, such as access to food when crops fail and often increased consumer choices, but they also raise 
signiﬁcant problems related to deregulating trade. For many countries, trade liberalization has failed to 
contribute to poverty reduction essentially because free markets are based on the premise of educated 
and empowered actors interacting in a more or less level playing ﬁeld. Given historic inequalities and 
systematic marginalization in certain societies, however, trade liberalization further dispossesses the 
poor. It is essential that governments intervene and enable local institutions to mediate transactions 
with the market to ensure a fair return for the poor.
A second critical area of government action, especially in the context of natural resources, is en-
forcement of a strong legal framework for the pattern and rate of extraction of resources to be com-
moditized. In the absence of this framework, the spiraling demands of the market end up merchandising 
invaluable resources at comparatively negligible prices for short-term gains. This process translates into 
the erosion of subsistence support for the poor and attacks the foundations of myriad forms of life. 
There is an immediate need to recognize the value of these resources, curtail extraction, and pay com-21
EARTH CITIZENSHIP, SELF-GOVERNANCE, AND POVERTY 
Why are the Politics of Poverty Not More Emphatic, Potent, and Visible?
         
I borrow this question from research that seeks to reinforce the need for policy to understand 
poverty better (Krishna 2006). In its angst, this question represents the concerns of all of us who believe 
in and have known the power of people speaking as one. So, in spite of considerable global action and 
strong efforts by local organizations, why is it that the MDG report reveals that between 1990 and 2004, 
the share of national consumption by the poorest ﬁfth of the population in developing regions declined 
from 4.6 to 3.9 percent (United Nations 2007)? 
Is it, in Chambers’s (1988) words, that “we do not have the apparatus—of meaning and signiﬁcance—
to understand poverty as local people see it”? Is it a lack of discernment that causes much of policy 
to treat the poor as a homogenous population? Even as we battle to respond to conditions of acute 
mensurate prices for replenishment. Strengthened processes of land use planning could identify areas 
for preservation, conservation, and exploitation. 
In the face of these complex challenges, we need to respond to the threat to our living environment 
while nurturing conditions for equitable growth. I believe the catalyzing force lies in communities’ and 
governments’ choice of conservation and acceptance of the responsibility of an Earth citizenship. 22
poverty, there are contexts of deprivation that push more people into similar conditions. To succeed, 
responses must address both groups with different speciﬁc strategies. 
Government must play a pivotal role on both counts. First, it has responsibility for collective well-
being—from food security to access to health, education, and basic social security. In an age when 
markets are increasingly claiming spaces that governments occupied, this need must remain the focus 
of the state. In the realms of health, education, and employment, we have seen that the dictates of the 
market are not concerned with issues of equity or altruism. The purposes of markets and governments 
are necessarily distinct. Although markets offer the promise of growth and are able to deliver it to a few, 
they are not concerned with those remaining. And in many countries, the people remaining, who do not 
have the access or bargaining power to beneﬁt from growth, make up the majority. Second, the vision of 
sustainable development is, in theory, incompatible with that of exponential growth based on increasing 
consumption. It remains the domain of government then to ensure the security of the poor in matters of 
subsistence and to tackle the forces of further impoverishment. 
Democratic decentralization and environmental protection are perhaps among the most critical  
commitments that can take on the forces that propagate and sustain chronic poverty. The experiences  
of an increasing number of villages and communities in many countries suggest that efforts to reduce 
poverty are more successful when they simultaneously promote democratic governance and ecosystem 
stewardship.
Democratic governance must be manifested by deliberative processes of self-governance and by 
local community institutions adequately invested with rights of management. Although local institu-
tions offer the promise of self-regulation of collective behavior regarding access to and appropriation of 
resources, it remains true that these institutions are vulnerable to cooption by the powerful. Upholding 
social justice and safeguarding the rights of the traditionally marginalized are tasks clearly in the domain 
of democratic governments. But experiments in decentralization, especially in developing countries, have 
found the challenges of structural change and unpreparedness for governance working against them.  23
The task then is to build the governance 
capacities of local governments, including  
planning and resource management skills that 
can help these bodies wisely allocate resources 
to various priorities and stakeholders. This effort 
must take place in conjunction with an analysis 
of a range of technologies, both old and new, 
that can contribute to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Such an analysis can inform 
decisionmaking processes and help ensure ad-
equate delivery systems that render technologies 
intelligible and accessible. Although providing 
opportunities for communities to participate 
in developing technologies could ensure that 
the beneﬁts address people’s needs, it is also 
necessary to create democratic systems to hold 
scientiﬁc and technological pursuits accountable 
to the people.
Responsible citizenship and a strong, com-
mitted government are the needs of the hour. 
A complementary endeavor is to create spaces 
where common people, scientists, executive  
bodies, and legislators can exchange views on 
the policies that mold their lives. These spaces 
can hold out hope for a future where a more  
egalitarian and humane society will shape its 
character with reverence for nature. 
Together, as individuals, communities, and governments, we need a sense of allegiance to the planet 
that transcends immediate individual spheres of concern. It must be a groundswell of realization at all 
levels that the progressive decimation of natural resources and violation of other life forms portend only 
acute deprivation and distress for the poorest among us and for humankind at large. 
We must seek a future where notions of human well-being are not reduced to purchasing power or 
mindless consumerism. We must seek a shift in attitude, moving beyond the belief that greater well-
being necessarily entails more consumption and recognizing that the power to consume more does not 
entail the right to do so. It is appropriate to recall the words of Gandhi, who cautioned us that the Earth 
would meet our collective need, but there would not be enough for everyone’s greed. As a society, we 
must seek for ourselves a future that is ecologically sustainable, economically sound, and socially just— 
a future where the latent potential of civil society is emancipated and where human dignity, spirit, and 
endeavor ﬁnd expression.24
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I 
have a credential for addressing you today that even those who   
invited me here may not be aware of.* At the age of four, I fought 
my best friend over food. It was pounded yam, a very special item of 
food that I sometimes describe as having a quasi-mystical status.
Changing Attitudes and Behaviors:
The Role of Africa’s Cultural Leaders
Wole Soyinka
*This is a reprint of an address given at an IFPRI conference, "Assuring Food and Nutrition Security 
in Africa by 2020," held in Kampala, Uganda.26
We made up, of course. My mother intervened. And I 
learned a lesson that has stayed with me all my life. I learned 
the lesson of extended families. I recognized ﬁnally that Osiki—
that was his name—was actually a member of the extended 
family and that compared with him I was a privileged child, 
not that we were an afﬂuent family. I realized that he actually 
relied for his daily sustenance on those meals that he used 
to share with me—with his over-large morsels, which is why 
we fought.
So we made up. But Osiki, unprivileged as he was compared 
with me, would consider his existence and my childhood to 
have been very privileged compared with that of millions of 
children today. He would swear to this ironic status of his even 
without watching contemporary footage of children from the 
hunger zones of the continent, their stomachs bloated in mal-
nourishment, victims of perennial drought and of war dis 
  placements year after year, but also victims of the improvident 
attitude of African leadership. Today Osiki would stare unbelieving at the images of homesteads where 
the only evidence of abundance would be swarms of ﬂies in competition for the least moisture on the 
eyes, lips, and nostrils of human beings sunk in lassitude. He would shudder at the attenuation of limbs 
of soon-to-be mortal statistics that continue to rebuke a continent of such diverse and abundant mate-
rial resources. He would recoil at the portent of once-thriving farming villages whose productive routine 
has been drastically attenuated by HIV/AIDS, the surviving inhabitants being just wide-eyed, orphaned 
children, looking lost, uncertain of the source of their next meal.
Food is allied to culture in the most organic, interactive way, and one may be brought to the aid of, 
enhancement of, or celebration of the other. We observe this not only in the lyricism that food evokes 
in some societies, but in the shared weight of multiple creative arts that are dedicated to the planting 
season and harvesting, elaborate performance gatherings that also serve the purpose of cohering the 
community. Most of us, however, prefer such collaboration to the external dependency mode; such as 
once occurred in one of the critical periods of food shortage on the continent, when a helpless visage of 
this continent came to be stamped on global consciousness.
Now, I readily admit that I am not a fan of pop music, but at least I have kept my dislike for that fre-
quent travesty of the musical art away from the actual creators—that is, until I heard the name of a cer-
tain Bob Geldof. The cause of my dislike was quite perverse. Bob Geldof was guilty of performing a duty 
that I considered mine, ours—the duty of the extended family that was the ethos of my upbringing and, 
I am certain, the upbringing of most of us here. Bob Geldof was the name that became identiﬁed, need 
I remind you, as the main initiator of a concert whose centerpiece was the famous “We Are the World.” 
My dislike of Bob Geldof, in other words, had nothing to do with music, but with pride, racial pride. Who 
was this man, this foreigner, who took it upon himself to ﬁll in a space of disregard, of indifference to 
the plight of a people by their own leaders?
There was, without question, also a sense of frustration, even envy. Only two years before that world 
music concert, I was editor of the African journal Transition, later to become Ch’Indaba. We warned of 27
the crisis of drought and famine in parts of Ethiopia, based on ﬁrsthand reports. We tended to dramatize 
the beginnings of another round of famine-induced migrations of Ethiopian villagers while the Emperor, 
Haile Selassie, wined and dined foreign dignitaries in the splendor of his palace. To drive the point home, 
we published a facsimile of the menu of a typical banquet that took place in the imperial palace side by 
side with images of starving families and makeshift camps.
Two or three years later, under the so-called People’s Revolutionary Regime of Mariam Mengistu, we 
were obliged to return to the same scenario of leadership planlessness, only this time, it had worsened 
beyond imagining. Once again, millions of humans were on the move, in ﬂight from certain starvation. 
The lessons of the previous years in Tigre and other provinces had not been absorbed.
African humanity, it seemed, was always expendable to most leaders. Human skeletons, of both 
adults and children, denoted trails that were reminiscent of the routes of the trans-Saharan slave 
routes—journeys that many, incidentally, like to pretend never did take place. The continent was absorb-
ing the bleak lesson that in the critical fulﬁllment of the primary mission of feeding its people, there was 
hardly any difference between neglect of the feudal kind and the myopia of revolutionary messianism.
What was singularly aggravating about the new famine in Ethiopia was that the increase in hu-
man suffering had been caused by an ill-digested notion of the productive strategies of collectivization. 
The ruling Dergue, stocked full of textbook notions about the transformation of means of production 
through centralism, commenced a policy of deliberate displacements, uprooted and dispersed entire 
peoples to artiﬁcial villages, but took no note of their traditions. Of course, some of these traditions have 
proved inadequate. But the inhuman revolutionary zeal of the Dergue only made matters worse.
The death toll mounted. The conscience of the world could stand it no longer. The pen may be 
mightier than the sword, but music proved far more efﬁcacious than both. Revolutionary slogans made 
way for the lyrics of the pop musician reminding the afﬂuent that indifference to material deﬁciency in 
one part of the world merely underlined the moral deﬁciency of the rest. I felt this rebuke personally and 
took a violent dislike to this man of conscience called Bob Geldof.
Many here will recall Chinua Achebe’s Arrow of 
God, a work that offers itself so readily today as a 
parable of social responsibilities and the consequences 
of their betrayal. The conduct of a central character in 
that novel, Ezeulu, the priest and spiritual guardian of 
the deity Ulu in an Ibo community, is a cautionary tale 
for the contemporary leadership of this continent. Of 
Ezeulu’s priestly duties, none was more crucial to the 
survival of the community than his role as the sign 
reader and transmitting medium for the planting sea-
son for the new yam—you know, that commodity over 
which I had fought my friend at four years of age.
If the harvest failed, and that meant if the seeds 
were not planted at the right moment—for instance, 
before a seasonal change that burnt the seedlings in 
the earth—starvation was guaranteed for the ensu-28
ing year. The manner in which this authorization was provided goes to the very heart of an integrated 
community existence on many levels, and indeed, goes to the heart of what I described earlier as the 
quasi-mystical status of the yam, underlining the cyclic nature of Earth’s renewal.
In Chinua Achebe’s narrative, that signal is withheld by Ezeulu. The entire village waits on their priest, 
but he has a bone to pick with his people. He is smarting from a humiliation meted out to him by the co-
lonial authority, in the person of a certain Captain Winterbottom, and additionally, from a political slight 
he has received from his own community. And so Ezeulu refuses to “see” the new moon whose appear-
ance communicates to him the moment that he must eat the ﬁnal symbolic tuber from the harvest of 
the previous year. He remains deaf to the pleas of the elders and turns a purely ritualistic procedure into 
a literal one. The welfare of the community is imperiled, but Ezeulu is unmoved. The priest, rather than 
make his world with his spiritual will and authority, was unmaking it, content to watch the community 
unravel at the seams.
Let me assert here the contemporary parallel that the conduct of Ezeulu evokes. It is a spiteful 
politics of some of our politicians who, because a constituency casts its votes for the opposition, proceed 
to impoverish that region, withholding public facilities, health, education, roads, water supply, including 
rudimentary bore holes, farming equipment, fertilizers, etc. Their language is, “You withheld your votes. 
Now go and eat your ballot.”
Chinua Achebe, when he embarked on that work, may have been unaware that he was setting down 
a contemporary morality tale that is so applicable to the plight of the continent and to the leaders’ 
betrayal of the natural expectations and conﬁdence of their people. For one thing, when he wrote that 
novel, the notion of famine on the scale of the past two decades was unheard of on the continent, even 
in the Sahelian regions or in former colonies such as the Congo, where traditional food production 
systems had been subverted by the colonial policies that forced their subjects to substitute cash crops 
for food crops. I refer here to that period when thriving communities were turned into mere production 
appendages to King Leopold’s commercial empire, a period of enforced quota systems when failure to 
attain was punished by the slicing of ears, slitting of nostrils, and amputation of limbs. In the colonial 
period, narrated in that work, the oil boom had not arrived to displace food as a primary preoccupation 
of peoples, resulting in once self-sustaining communities, now amalgamated into independent enti-
ties, ﬁnding themselves compelled to import even basic foods of which they were once, in some cases, 
exporters of surplus. When Arrow of God was written, neither the author nor anyone else had ever heard 
of a devastating afﬂiction called HIV/AIDS.
Chinua Achebe’s community of the deity Ulu is the paradigm of our continent, a continent await-
ing the signal that would inaugurate a comprehensive planting that will sustain its people—that is, the 
annunciation of a creative, sustained, practical strategy attuned to the realities of uneven industrializa-
tion and new national entities, calling up a remedial response to the break-up of the organic productive 
systems of precolonial society, its demographic shifts, and the consequences of our brutal wars.
Could it be that IFPRI aspires to be the resurrected spirit of Ezeulu? But with the admonition that  
a community cannot wait on the voice of one individual alone, but must act collectively and methodi-
cally. IFPRI— well, not as euphonious a name as Ezeulu and hardly of totally indigenous origin, but as  
we say in my part of the world, if the man sees the poisonous snake, but it takes a woman to kill it, all 
that matters to the menaced homestead is that the snake is dead.29
When Arrow of God was written in the early 1960s, the oil palm industry of southern Nigeria was 
still ﬂourishing. The landscape of the northern part was adorned with groundnut pyramids, attaining 
such iconographic status that they were used on the national postage stamps. It is not mere nostalgia, 
therefore, but the necessity for our self-indictment, a bitter stock-taking, that wrung the following lines 
out of me, lines from the poem “Elegy for a Nation” in the collection Samarkand and Other Markets  
I Have Known:
W
e grew ﬁlament eyes
As heads of millet, as ﬂakes of cotton responsive
To brittle breezes, wraith-like in the haze of Harmattan
Green of the cornﬁelds of Oyo, ochre of groundnut pyramids
Of Kano, indigo in the ancient dye-pots of Abeokuta
We were the cattle nomads, silent threads through
Forestries and cities, coastland and savannah
Wafting Maiduguri to the sea, ocean mists to sand dunes
Alas for lost idyll ...        
  ... Ghosts are sole inheritors.
Silos fake rotundity — these are kwashi-okor blights
Upon the landscape, depleted at source. Even
The harvest seeds were long devoured. Empty hands
Scrape the millennial soil at planting.30
Yes, “even the harvest seeds were long devoured,” both ﬁguratively, out of greed, by incontinent lead-
ership, but sometimes also from necessity, as happened in Igboland during the civil war. This condition 
must be recognized as the continuing fate of many African zones of civil war today, where antipersonnel 
mines reduce the yield potential of land even further and ﬁnish off what HIV/AIDS has begun.
In Samarkand I was indeed invoking the nation that we once knew, but Nigeria was only one of 
many such travesties. At least there had been war in Nigeria, with attendant distortion of production 
processes. The ascendancy of a war industry that resulted in the abandonment of multiple economic 
devices—but agriculture most especially—was a phenomenon that simply transferred itself to the oil 
industry once oil was discovered.
Not even successive attempts at mobilization under slogans such as “Operation Feed Yourself,” 
“Operation Feed the Nation,” “Operation This and Whatever Else” have succeeded in the resuscitation of 
the farm as primary source for a people’s food security. Often, the main target of such endeavors was 
youth—how to turn the sight of youth away from the glitzy attractions of urban living and challenge 
them with the vital contributions that can be extracted from that basic resource, land. Nigeria is only an 
illustration, and it is improving these days.
No one requires to be told that this anomaly has spread all over the continent, and even in nations, 
like Ghana, that did not undergo the production distortion of civil war or an oil boom. I was sojourning 
in that nation when the markets dried up. The staple food, kenke, made from fermented corn, shrank 
until it virtually vanished into its wrapping of leaves, while the supermarkets’ display cases held nothing 31 31
but shelled coconuts. That was the paradox: There was no shortage of food in the land, but there was 
starvation. Food crops simply rotted away on the farms for lack of transportation thanks to the inconti-
nent conduct, indifference, and neglect of the ruling military.
We cannot exactly return to that integrated phase of communal life, where the very process of 
cultivation, like other forms of life-preserving labor, was related to the overall cultural being of the com-
munity. But we can come reasonably close. We can reinvent the gods, exploiting their timeless function-
alism.
I propose this dimension not merely because I am a compulsive mythologist, but because I would 
like to see when the new sign reader and interactive medium of our times—I’ll call it “Ezeulu-IFPRI”—next 
sounds the gong for planting. But it is not merely experts who are summoned, but a fair representation 
of the small-scale, even subsistence, farmers, who remained faithful to their vocation, are closer to earth 
than most of us here, and are sometimes unconscious researchers into the science of food. It helps, of 
course, if we can link them, through familiar cultural symbols, to the world of modernity and constant 
technological innovations.
The two relevant deities here are, ﬁrst, none other than that confessed favorite of mine, Ogun, in all 
his myriad transformations, the god of metallurgy and the patron deity of agriculture, a role he shares 
with another deity, Orisa-oko. Orisa-oko is the very spirit of leaves, the farm, and the moist elements, 
while Ogun is the technological impulse that transforms nature from the most rudimentary hoe and 
machete to the complex combine harvester, the churning mills, and transportation conveyances.
There are several models on whose scaffolding such basic, life-afﬁrming strategies, the antithesis of 
hunger and starvation, can be mounted. I see no reason why a day cannot be dedicated to the culture 
of food renewal, its science and technology, every year, utilizing the seasonal festivals of Orisa-oko and 
Ogun, or their equivalents in other African cultures. Regionally or continentwide, it does not matter; 
the goal is to marry the cultural wealth and celebration of relevant mythologies to a forward focus on 
modernization through recall and celebration.
Let it never be forgotten that in the liturgies of worship, traditional songs, and rituals are lodged 
much knowledge concerning not merely the science of crops and food, but the pharmacology of healing. 
From the spirit of that past, new songs will emerge attuned to the present, abandoning the charity-pro-
pelled “We Are the World,” that song of dependency, to the self-afﬁrmation of “We Make Our World.”32
I envision, in short, a working festival that recovers the ethos of farming integration with life-
sustaining processes, encounters that anticipate, not simply respond to, devastating vagaries of nature. 
Technical expositions, contests with awards that will stimulate inventiveness in the technology of food 
preservation and pest control, experimentation in the cultivation of new varieties, disease-resisting 
strains, high-yield varietals, promotion of organic fertilizers that do away with controversial chemicals—
in short, an entire revolution in our approach to the food sciences that were developed for other climes, 
other soils, and other industrial cultures, instead giving primacy of place to our own authoritative voices, 
not simply the politicians’, over the merits or demerits of genetically altered crops.
The past has much to teach, even if the present rides on the engines of the future. The trajectory of 
surplus and scarcity would be plotted in scientiﬁc caucuses that would be part of such a ﬁesta, with, 
of course, a gallery of negativities as correctives—those hideous scars on the African conscience that 
watched millions perish from neglect.
Culture and cultivation are deeply entrenched in traditional society. The younger generation, that 
is, the future, is the primary target—those who are more at home with Nintendo games than with a 
creative engagement with the soil that has nourished their ancestors from prehistory and sustains their 
very existence. If we can appeal to a youthful sense of imagination and excitement at the potential of 
this neglected ﬁeld of resources, I believe that half the battle against hunger will be no battle at all, but a 
celebration of nature in transformation, stimulated by home-evolved ingenuities.
Yes, culture and the arts can prove handmaidens of cultivation. We have a choice, however: either 
to create our own cultural incentives that motivate productivity and lead to self-reliance, or await the 
handouts from the charity of the world. We must remember, however, that there is a condiment that 
must be swallowed with the food of charity: a chastening ingredient that is known as “pride.” The choice 
is therefore no choice at all.
  We owe it to the future that those same ﬂy-infested mouths of want that presently occupy the 
gallery of a failed past are ﬁlled with the self-empowerment that will launch a new chant from the Sahel 
to the Cape: “We Make Our World.”
Wole Soyinka is a Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature. The text above is a reprint of his 2004 address 
to an international audience gathered in Kampala, Uganda for a three-day conference on African food and 
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